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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 990708-CA 
v. : 
PEARL TOPANOTES, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal form a third degree felony conviction for possession of heroin, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999). This Court has 
jurisdiction of the appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Where the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress is based on its 
erroneous conclusion that no detention occurred here, can the ruling be affirmed on 
the alternative ground that discovery of the outstanding warrants leading to 
defendant's arrest and search-incident thereto was inevitable? 
Because the trial court found no illegality, it did not consider any exceptions to the 
exclusionary rule. Therefore, as the trial court did not pass on this alternative, "inevitable 
discovery" exception to the exclusionary rule, no standard of review applies. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probably cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized. 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of heroin, a third degree felony (R. 7). 
Defendant moved to suppress evidence seized during a warrantless search of her person 
incident to her arrest on outstanding warrants (R. 29). Following an evidentiary hearing, 
the trial court denied the motion (R. 98:3-4) (a copy of the oral ruling is contained in the 
addendum). Defendant entered a conditional plea and was sentenced to an indeterminate 
statutory prison term of zero-to-five years at the Utah State Prison (R. 93-98). Defendant 
timely appealed (R. 74). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Several Salt Lake City police officers were patrolling a known "prostitute track" 
on North Temple, on 7 October 1998, and arrested prostitute Glenna Thomas (R. 88:7-
13). Salt Lake City police routinely attempt to confirm an arrested prostitute's actual 
residence (R. 88:12-13). Accordingly, three officers, including Sgt. Hansen, and Officer 
Mitchell, had Thomas take them to the trailer where she claimed to live with a girlfriend 
2 
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named Pearl, a short native American who she said also worked as prostitute (R. 88:8-9, 
20). 
Officer Mitchell knocked on the trailer door, but received no response (R. 88:25). 
He then talked to the owner of the home on the same property (id). The homeowner 
confirmed that a short Native American girl named Pearl lived in the trailer (R. 88:26). 
As the officers were leaving the premises, Officer Mitchell saw defendant walk by 
and observed that she fit the homeowner's description of the Native American girl that 
lived in the trailer (R. 88:27). Sgt. Hansen also saw defendant walking toward the trailer 
(R. 88:13). Sgt. Hansen identified himself as a police officer and asked defendant if she 
had any identification (R. 88:10). When defendant provided identification, Sgt. Hansen 
handed it to Officer Mitchell and asked him to call it in for a warrants check (R. 88:10-
14). While waiting for the warrants check to be completed, Sgt. Hansen attempted to 
confirm with defendant Thomas's identity and residence (R. 88:11). The warrants check 
was completed within five minutes and revealed two outstanding warrants for defendant 
(R. 88:22). She was arrested and searched incident to the arrest; the search revealed 
heroin on her person (id.). 
At the suppression hearing, defense counsel elicited that police routinely check for 
outstanding warrants under these circumstances (R. 88:16). Although Thomas had 
reported living with a prostitute named Pearl, Sgt. Hansen did not "at that moment" 
suspect defendant of any criminal activity (id.). Officer Mitchell concurred that while 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
they had information defendant was also a prostitute, they did not then suspect of her 
soliciting (R. 88:28). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The State acknowledges that, based on the instant facts, the trial court erred in 
determining that no detention occurred when police retained defendant's identification 
while running a warrants check. However, the record supports an analytically sound 
alternative ground for affirmance: the inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary 
rule. Indeed, as a warrants check under these circumstances is routine procedure, the 
instant check would have been conducted even without the physical retention of 
defendant's identification. It was therefore inevitable that police would discover 
defendant's outstanding warrants and that she would be arrested thereon. Any contraband 
seized during the search incident-to-arrest on the outstanding warrants is accordingly 
admissible. 
ARGUMENT 
THE RULING BELOW SHOULD BE AFFIRMED ON THE 
ALTERNATIVE GROUND THAT DEFENDANT'S OUTSTANDING 
WARRANTS WOULD INEVITABLY HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED 
DURING THE WARRANTS CHECK, REGARDLESS OF 
WHETHER POLICE FIRST RETURNED OR RETAINED HER 
IDENTIFICATION 
On appeal, defendant asserts that she was improperly detained when police held 
her personal identification during a warrants check performed in the absence of any 
reasonable suspicion that she was involved in solicitation or other criminal activity. Aplt. 
4 
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Br. at 15-27. Defendant's argument has merit. See Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App. 
55, fl3 (holding that retention of defendant's identification during a warrants check 
amounted to detention requiring Fourth Amendment justification).l 
However, as police would have run the warrants check even if they had not 
retained defendant's identification, her arrest on outstanding warrants was inevitable, as 
was the search incident thereto, revealing heroin on her person. The trial court's ruling 
should therefore be affirmed on the alternative ground of inevitable discovery. See Debry 
v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428,444 (Utah 1995) (affirming on alternative grounds); State v. S. V., 
906 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah App. 1995) (same). 
A. Defendant's Identification Was Obtained During a 
Voluntary Level One Encounter 
The trial court properly ruled that defendant's encounter with police was initially a 
level one voluntary encounter which required no Fourth Amendment justification (R. 
98:3) (a copy of the trial court's oral ruling is contained in the addendum). Ray, 2000 
UT 55, fflf9-12 (citing State v. Deitman,739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)). Indeed, 
police can lawfully approach a citizen and request identification without triggering Fourth 
Amendment protections. Id. at ^ [12; State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah App. 
1990) (recognizing that as a matter of law a request for identification cannot constitute a 
show of authority sufficient to convert an innocent encounter into a seizure), cert, denied, 
defendant's brief was filed on 14 February 2000, just 17 days before Ray was 
issued on 2 March 2000. 
5 
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815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). See also Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,434, 439 (1991) 
(acknowledging that police can approach individuals without reasonable suspicion and 
ask them potentially incriminating questions). Thus, defendant does not dispute that 
police lawfully obtained her identification during the initial level one, or voluntary 
encounter. Aplt. Br. at 8. 
B. Retention of the Identification Constituted a Level Two 
Detention 
However, here, the voluntary encounter rose to a level two detention when police 
did not immediately return defendant's identification, but retained it while running the 
warrants check {see R. 98:7). Ray, 2000 UT 55 at lfl[13-17. A level two detention must 
be supported by reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at *fl8. Officers Hansen 
and Mitchell made plain that they did not suspect defendant of solicitation or other 
criminal behavior when they approached to question her about Thomas, the prostitute 
they had just arrested, and whose identity and residence they wrere attempting to verify 
(R.88:16, 28). Absent reasonable suspicion that defendant was herself soliciting, or 
otherwise involved in criminality, the detention engendered by retaining her identification 
during the warrants check was unjustified under Ray. Id. at ^ [13-17. The trial court erred 
in concluding otherwise. Id. 
6 
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C. The Inevitable Discovery Rule Presents a Sound 
Alternative Ground for Affirmance 
Notwithstanding the illegal detention in this case, the inevitable discovery rule 
allows the admission of evidence "if the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by 
lawful means." Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,444 (1984). Indeed, the inevitable 
discovery rule permits 
the prosecution to purge the taint of illegally obtained evidence by proving, 
by a preponderance of the evidence, that such evidence inevitably would 
have been discovered, absent the illegality, by proper and predictable police 
investigative procedures. 
State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 225, 242 (Ore. 1985), cert, denied, 475 U.S. 141 (1986). See 
also United States v. Larsen, 127 F.3d 984, 987 (10th Cir. 1997), cert, denied, 522 U.S. 
1140 (1998). Accordingly, the issue in determining "inevitable discovery" is what would 
have occurred if the investigation had continued without the illegality. Nix, 467 U.S. at 
444 & 459; Larsen, 127 F.3d at 987. The majority of courts follow the Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals which requires no absolute proof, beyond evidence of predictable police 
routine, of what would have hypothetically occurred absent the illegality. 
[T]he inevitable discovery exception applies whenever an independent 
investigation inevitably would have led to discovery of the evidence, 
whether or not the investigation was ongoing at the time of the illegal police 
conduct. 
7 
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LarsenMl F.3d at 986.2 
As elicited below, a warrants check under the instant circumstances is predictable 
police routine (R. 88:16, 22, 27). See, e.g., State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 
1987) and State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 985 (Utah App. 1994) (both involving routine 
warrants checks, the former during a voluntary encounter, and the latter pursuant to 
reasonable suspicion). See also People v. Bo user, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 163, 164 (Cal. App. 
1994) (warrants check "standard procedure"), cert, denied, 514 U.S. 1039 (1995); Wilson 
v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 217 (Wyo. 1994) ("routine warrants check"); State v. Madrigal, 
827 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Wash App. 1992) ("Outstanding warrant checks during valid 
2This Court first recognized inevitable discovery as an exception to the 
exclusionary rule in State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288, 1293 (Utah App. 1988); see also 
State v. Genovesi, 909 P.2d 916 (Utah App. 1995); Wayne R. LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 11.4(a), at 241 (3rd Ed. 1996). Subsequently, in State v. James, this Court 
adopted a singular interpretation of the rule, holding for the first time that the prosecution 
must prove that an "entirely independent, alternative, intervening, appreciable attenuated 
investigation aside from the tainted investigation" was inevitable to successfully invoke 
the inevitable discovery exception. 1999 UT App. 17,1J18-20, 977 P.2d 489, cert, 
granted, 984 P.2d 1023 (Utah 1999). According to James, the inevitable investigation 
may not be a theoretical or substitute lawful investigation but must be a completely 
"independent, parallel" investigation. Id. The State acknowledges that it could not 
prevail on the instant facts under the inevitable discovery rule as it has been interpreted in 
James. However, as noted above, the Utah Supreme Court has granted certiorari to 
review the expansive and unworkable new test adopted in James, including its 
misinterpretation of the 10th Circuit's opinion in Larsen. James, 984 P.2d at 1023. Oral 
argument in James was held on 25 May 2000. Because James is likely determinative 
here, the State moved to stay the instant proceedings pending the supreme court's 
disposition in James. See contemporaneous Motion to Stay Oral Argument. This Court 
denied the motion on 5 May 2000. 
8 
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criminal investigatory stops are reasonable routine police procedures.'9); State v. 
Johnson, 517 N.E.2d 262, 263 (Ohio App. 1986) ("routine warrant check"). 
As further noted by the trial court, a warrants check can generally be performed 
any time on any individual (R. 88:37). See Ray, 2000 UT 55, at % 13 n.2 (recognizing 
that if an officer views the defendant's identification, obtains the desired information, and 
promptly returns it, "[a] warrant check will not per se escalate the encounter into a level 
two stop[:]" Indeed, assuming the defendant is not otherwise detained, "the officer may 
run a warrants check or make any other use of the information"); See also State v. 
Soukharith, 570 N.W.2d 344, 353 (Neb. 1997) (reasonable suspicion not required to run 
a warrants check where suspect was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment). Therefore, having verified defendant's name, the preponderance of the 
evidence demonstrates that the instant warrants check would have been performed with or 
without physical retention of defendant's identification (R. 88:16, 22, 27). See State v. 
Navanick, 1999 UT App. 265 ffl[2-3, 987 P.2d 1276 (police performed warrants check 
based on witness report of defendant's name). 
Significantly, Ray does not preclude application of the inevitable discovery rule on 
these facts. Indeed, Ray is distinguishable on the ground that evidence seized there would 
not otherwise have inevitably been discovered because Ray's consent to search was 
obtained during the illegal detention in that case. Id. at ^ [20, n.9. See, e.g., State v. 
Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289 (Utah 1995) (consent to search obtained during course of an 
9 
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unjustified roadblock stop held to be insufficiently attenuated from the illegal stop). 
Defendant's reliance on State v. Johnson,805 P.2d 761 (Utah 1991) and State v. Hansen, 
837 P.2d 987 (Utah App. 1992), is similarly distinguishable from the initial voluntary 
encounter in this case. This is because both cases involve traffic-stop scenarios; 
therefore, the police-citizen encounters necessarily began as level two detentions 
requiring Fourth Amendment justification from their inception. Johnson, 805 P.2d at 
764; Hansen, 837 P.2d at 989. Thus, similar to the request for consent to search in Ray, 
the request for identification in these cases was made during an illegal detention. Ibid. 
In contrast to traffic-stop cases, and as conceded by defendant, the police-citizen 
encounter here began as a voluntary level one encounter and continued as such until 
police retained defendant's identification, instead of returning it to her before running the 
warrants check (R. 98:3), add. A. Aplt. Br. at 8. This means that no information 
necessary to performing the warrants check was obtained during the course of the illegal 
detention in this case. Thus, the instant warrants check was not at all dependent upon the 
illegal detention for its successful completion-It would have been conducted with or 
without the detention, and with or without physical retention of defendant's identification 
(R. 88:16,22,28). It was therefore inevitable that police would discover defendant's 
outstanding warrants and that she would be arrested thereon. Any contraband seized 
during the search incident-to-arrest on the outstanding warrants is accordingly admissible. 
Jackson, 805 P.2d at 769. 
10 
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CONCLUSION 
Notwithstanding the trial court's erroneous ruling that no detention occurred when 
the police retained defendant's identification, the denial of the motion to suppress should 
be affirmed. The inevitable discovery rule applies here because defendant's outstanding 
warrants would have inevitably been discovered during the routine and predictable 
warrants check, with or without retaining defendant's identification.3 Therefore, 
contraband seized during the search of defendant's person incident to her arrest on the 
outstanding warrants was properly admitted. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED on ]S_ May 2000. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
RIAN DECKER 
ssistant Attorney General 
3To the extent that there is any question on this record as to the applicability of the 
inevitable discovery rule, the proper remedy is remand to allow the trial court to make 
that fact sensitive determination in the first instance. 
11 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
MR. DELLAPIANA: I think she 
pronounces it Topanotes. 
THE COURT: Topanotes Thank you 
probably won't get it right anyway; but Topanotes. 
And :! t s 98 J "9208 5 3 991 91 99 3 92 . In the latter 
case, she's charged with a Class B misdemeanor of 
mischievous conduct, I've never seer couched ill" 
Mischievous conduct? Is that how the City 
categorizes it? I would have thought it would be 
disorderly, or... 
In any event, and the other one is illegal 
possession of a controlled substance, a third-degree. 
The defei idai it I :ias jc I:i led i is Good morning, Ms. 
Topanotes• 
MS. TOPANOTES: Good m o r n i n g . 
THE COUR'J • Aikl 1 Ill note for the 
record that Mr. Dellapiana is here on her behalf. The 
State is represented. 
And I've an opportunity to consider by way 
of what has been submitted by way of written product on 
the motion to suppress and "iiri prepared 
also have taken into account and carefully 
2 
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considered the case law as well as the testimony that was 
adduced at our last hearing. 
Counsel, I'm happy to hear from you and when I 
say I'm ready to rule, that does not mean that I'm not 
listening with an open mind to what both sides have to 
say. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: The only thing I 
would ask is if you did get a copy of the reply brief 
that the State submitted? 
THE COURT: Yes, I did, and did not 
even start to do my reading until I had that so I had the 
full context before me. 
MR. DELLAPIANA: Judge, I have 
nothing to add, we'd just submit it. 
THE COURT: Counsel? 
MR. KOURIS: The State would submit 
it as well, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. I will 
indicate that in this matter, I think it was an 
appropriate motion for the defense to bring to clarify 
the law; however, I'm going to deny the motion on the 
following basis: 
I find that the stop at issue was a Level One 
stop. The distinction between the Level Two Terry stop— 
or excuse me—the--the distinction between the Level One 
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stop and the more serious Level Two stop obviously is 
predicated upon articulable suspicion to justify the 
stop. In th 
point, because I think this stops short of a Level Two 
stop. 
I'll,*1 In .". If! i Hi.i,i 1 I'll!I w h e t h e r o n e is In a n ' 
automobile or on foot, the police have the right to stop 
someone in a Level One manner, for a short, 
ion-type search; merely to ask the person who 
they are Fills is permissible, as long as it is a purely 
consensual, short-term encounter ai id bhat ther e i s :i 10 
seizure, that is to say, arrest or detention beyond the 
person's will. 
The appeals tu iepemil upon whether 
there is any kind of actual arrest or any kind of 
physical force or authority exerted or whether the other 
person b e l i e v e I111111: JJ tiei freedom of movement i s 
restrained. But the standard, and this is clear under 
State vs. Rameriz f is clearly an objective standa d and 
it's dependent on whether the defendant remained 
cooperatively or because she believed she was not free to 
leave. 
In this case, based upon all the testimony 
adduced, this Court finds that there was absolutely no 
testimony that she WAS1 ./uiH^ e 1 led 111 1 rni.i 111 Lul rather, 
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that she remained cooperatively, because the police did 
not in any way restrict her freedom to leave nor did she 
voice any objection. 
The Court also takes into account in making 
this assessment of whether there was a show of authority 
of a compelling nature, or physical force, the demeanor 
of the police officer witnesses and the tone of their 
voices, recognizing that it might have been different on 
the occasion when they met with the defendant, the Court 
nonetheless notes that while some police officers have 
particularly compelling physical presence by virtue of 
stature or the tone of their voice or the depth of their 
voice or the manner in which they speak being 
particularly dramatic, the officers in question did not 
manifest any of this. 
On the contrary, they both appear to be quite 
soft-spoken, gentlemanly, professional individuals, not 
particularly intimidating by virtue—or not intimidating 
by virtue of demeanor voice or size, from what the Court 
could observe and there is nothing before me to indicate 
otherwise. 
It appears clear further from the facts that 
Officer Hansen asked her for identification, that she 
voluntarily presented the same. 
Further, the Court finds that while there were 
5 
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thr ee officers li i i the general vicinity when Ms. Topanotes 
was stopped, to characterize this as three officers 
surrounding her appears to be tailed by IMIhie factus. 
While it's a very good argument and if it had 
been supported by the facts, it night be more compelling 
t fi III «!• 'ouft "Idi iri. i i I I null-. I hut I In- t e s t i m o n y , a s I 
recall, was that three never did surround her, that there 
were three in the general vicinity but only one directly 
the third, quite some distance away. And that there was 
no attempt to surround her or give her the impress r 
Iiberty had been restricted. 
Further, the Court notes that under State vs. 
VMilialaiia# the appellate case atate vs. 
Hansen, the Court feels that this ruling is appropriate. * 
Although if is not an automobile-type seizure and of 
inci>&t" ID" 1 t l h i e i i " i i s i 3 l a w iioes io thai I1, tie Court 
feels that the basic underlying rationale in all of the 
cases that look at Level One and Level Two stops, needs 
to ]lb e c oi isi der ed :I i m this case as we] 
The Court has also considered State v. Jackson r 
the appellate case from 1990, which had wonderful 
language :i ini ii t that I will'repeat, which I believe is 
helpful in making the assessment. 
That case?111 .;• Il h;ii;je Jfifl is i a I; ed
 ( quo te , lfA 
6 
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request for identification cannot constitute a show of 
authority sufficient to convert an innocent encounter 
into a seizure. Only when police have in some way 
restrained the liberty of an individual, either by force 
or a show of authority, is there a seizure within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 
Now, while the officers or officer at one point 
had her identification, there was no testimony to suggest 
that if she had asked for it to be returned to her or 
said that wanted to leave, that anyone would have stopped 
her; in fact, my recollection is the officers indicated 
clearly she was not under arrest and her liberty had not 
been curtailed. 
In making this determination, this Court has 
considered what courts before me have considered: the 
time of the day or night of the encounter; where the 
encounter occurred, in this case, the fact that the 
defendant was already outside of her home, was walking 
toward her home, that the encounter did not even involve 
taking her off the path she was on or to a different 
locale, they let her remain in the same manner, which as 
I understand it, was close to her home, a comfort zone. 
There appears to be no isolation involved and 
there appears, from the testimony, to be no indication of 
a confrontational encounter. 
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Further, the testimony and I cannot with 
specificity point to the exact time, but I believe an 
officer said five iirli iinil cs mi IliPiiih wui the time cut hei 
actual stay with the police officers while they did her 
identification check, or the warrants check on the 
identi ficat ion provided 
Again, there has been no testimony supportive 
of a weapon exhibited or used by the police, no testimony 
of any touching ol liei i in \w\\ wa | i;«n make her f e e l 
intimidated or stop her from moving forward in a physical 
manner, no angry voices, inappropriate language or rough 
tone has been attested to; on the contrary, the Court has 
made the observations already noted. 
She :i s br i ef ] y ! juesti oi led :1 i it. no w ay deta I i led 
against her will The Court can find nothing to suggest 
a confrontational aspect of this encounter* The mere 
presence of tilie poll MI/T nif f icer and l.hei!; r e q u e s t -
officers and their request for identification is not 
sufficient to escalate this to a Level Two Terry stop. 
Over all, there was no evidence that the 
defendant raised any objection, either by her demeanor or 
any kind of non-verbal display or verbally to the 
provision of her identification or the warrants check. 
And for these reasons, the Court denies the 
moti on to suppress. 
8 
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I have gone into some detail because I'm 
assuming that this may be an issue on appeal and I'm 
going to ask the State, Mr. Kouris, if you would, to 
prepare findings as well as an order denying the motion. 
MR. KOURIS: I will, your Honor. 
THE COURT: And if you wish to look 
at the tape, if I went to fast or to follow up with any 
questions, you're welcome to. 
Did I — 
MR. KOURIS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: —manage to articulate it 
clearly enough? 
MR. KOURIS: I think you did. 
THE COURT: All right. 
MR. KOURIS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: That brings us, I 
suppose, to the next step and Ms. Topanotes, no judge 
who's honest would ever tell you that they're absolutely 
sure that rulings that they make is correct. What one is 
owed in a court of law is not a lack of error because 
judges are human beings, we do our best, but fairness. 
And so I have fairly considered the law and this was my 
determination as to what the law is. I may be wrong and 
I would hope I'm not, but if I am, you certainly have the 
right to appeal this and I'm sure Mr. Dellapiana has 
9 
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On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
DVRRANT, Jnyt;isa: 
51 The State petitioned for review of a court of appeals' 
decision reversing the trial court's denial of Douglas B. James's 
motion to suppress evidence. After the trial court denied 
James's motion to suppress/ he was convicted of driving under the 
influence of alcohol. On appeal, the court of appeals held that 
a police officer violated James's Fourth Amendment rights when he 
opened the door of James's truck, while James was seated inside 
the truck, for the purpose of investigating a citizen's report of 
reckless driving. 2£& State v, James, 1999 OT App. 17, Mll-14, 
977 P.2d 489. The court of appeals also held that the inevitable 
discovery doctrine was inapplicable. See id. at 1115-23. We 
granted certiorari, see S^ate v. James, 984 P.2d 1023 (Utah 
1999), and now reverse the court of appeals. 
BACKGROUND 
32 On March 16, 1996, a citizen approached Utah Highway 
Patrol Trooper Jason Kendrick and reported that he had just seen 
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a reckless driver. The citizen stated that a dark-colored pickup 
truck was "all over the road" and had "hit or . . . almost 
struck'' three other vehicles. The citizen was able to provide 
Kendrick with the truck's license number, approximate location, 
and direction of travel. Kendrick contacted highway patrol 
dispatch and confirmed that the license number matched the 
vehicle description provided by the citizen. Kendrick obtained 
the registered address of the truck's owner and drove to that 
address. As he neared the residence, he saw a truck matching the 
citizen's and dispatcher's description enter the driveway, where 
it stopped and remained with its brake lights on. Kendrick 
pulled up behind the truck with his headlights on, left his 
patrol car, and approached the truck's driver's-side door. 
During the time it took Kendrick to stop and approach, no one 
attempted to leave the truck. 
$3 Kendrick looked in the window and saw two persons, 
James, who was in the driver's seat, and a female in the 
passenger seat.1 Kendrick opened the door and asked the driver, 
James, to get out of the truck. Once the door was open, Kendrick 
saw a 12-pack of beer on the passenger-side floor of the cab, 
with one can opened. Kendrick and James walked to the front of 
the truck, where Kendrick asked to see James's driver's license. 
James dropped his license when he pulled it from his wallet. 
Kendrick noted that James smelled strongly of alcohol, his face 
was flaccid, his speech slurred, and his eyes were droopy and 
bloodshot. Kendrick also observed that James "appeared to be 
unstable, unable to stand straight" without keeping his feet 
apart or moving. Kendrick expressed concern about the 
possibility that James had been involved in an accident. 
Kendrick and James walked around the truck and scanned it for 
signs of damage, but found none. 
514 At about this time, the female passenger left the 
vehicle and "was very upset . . . yelling, screaming, that kind 
of thing." Kendrick became concerned for his safety, told James 
to remain where he was and returned to his patrol car to call for 
backup. James instead went inside his home. When the backup 
officer, Trooper Arlow Hancock, arrived, he and Kendrick entered 
the attached garage through the open garage door. They knocked 
on the door leading from the garage into the house and told James 
that if he did not come out they would come in to get him. James 
came out and performed a standard field sobriety test, which he 
x
 At the suppression hearing, Kendrick indicated that he 
had some concerns for his safety due to the high profile of the 
truck, which prevented him from observing what was taking place 
in the cab of the truck below his line of vision. 
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failed. When James attempted to walk away again, the officers 
arrested him. James was taken to the Cache County jail/ where he 
refused to take any further sobriety tests or a breathalyzer 
test. The State charged James with driving under the influence 
and having an open container of alcohol in his vehicle. 
55 At trial, James moved to suppress evidence of his 
intoxicated condition. He asserted three Fourth Amendment 
grounds for suppression: (1) Kendrick initially lacked reasonable 
suspicion to stop his truck or detain him; (2) Kendrick opened 
the door to his truck without probable cause; and (3) Kendrick 
and Hancock lacked the probable cause and exigent circumstances 
necessary to enter his garage without a warrant* The trial court 
denied James's motions. A jury convicted James of driving under 
the influence, but acquitted him on the open container charge. 
SIC On appeal, the court of appeals addressed only the 
argument relating to Kendrick's opening of the truck door. The 
court of appeals ruled that the officer's opening of the vehicle 
door constituted a search of the vehicle rather than an 
investigative detention and that the search was illegal. See 
James, 1999 UT App. 17, M12-14, 977 P.2d at 491-92. It then 
discussed the "inevitable discovery'' exception to the warrant 
requirement and concluded that the exception was inapplicable. 
Saa isL at 1115-22. 
57 We granted the State's petition for certiorari. On 
certiorari review, the State argues that the court of appeals 
construed cases prohibiting police from opening a vehicle door in 
certain circumstances too broadly and out of context. 
Specifically, the State contends that where an officer has the 
right to order a person to temporarily leave a vehicle, the 
officer's mere opening of a vehicle door cannot constitute an 
illegal search. The State also argues that the court of appeals 
erred in its application of the inevitable discovery doctrine. 
ANALYSIS 
58 "On certiorari, we review the decision of the court of 
appeals, not the decision of the trial court." State v. Harmon, 
910 P.2d 1196, 1199 (Utah 1995). M'We review the court of 
appeals' decision for correctness and give its conclusions of law 
no deference.' "• CarEitor y, Ptg-Tsch RMtqgflUon; 944 P.2d 346, 
350 (Utah 1997) (quoting Newspaper Acrencv Corp. v. Auditing Div,, 
938 P.2d 266, 267 (Utah 1997)). 
19 We begin our analysis with a brief statement of two 
fundamental and related tenets of Fourth Amendment caselaw. 
First, the presumptive rule relating to reasonable searches and 
3 No. 990267 
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seizures is that searches may not be conducted without a warrant 
supported by probable cause. See Katz v. Ijnited States, 389 U.S. 
347, 357 (1967). .There are a number of "exceptions" to the 
presumptive rule, however. See id. The application of those 
exceptions is guided by the second tenet, which is that the 
fundamental right protected by the Fourth Amendment is a person's 
reasonable expectation of privacy. Se,3 United States v. 
Jacobsen. 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984). 
110 Due to the mobile nature of vehicles and their highly-
regulated status, persons traveling in vehicles have a lesser 
expectation of privacy than they would have within a private 
dwelling. See California v. Carnev. 471 U.S. 386, 391 (1985); 
gpUtft PafcQtfl Vi Ppperiqan, 428 U.S. 364, 368 (1976); see also 
CfldY Yt PpmfrgpwgHl/ 413 U.S. 433, 442 (1973); Chambers v. 
tterenSY/ 399 U.S. 42, 52 (1970); Cooper v. California. 386 U.S. 
58, 59 (1967). The so-called "automobile exception" to the 
warrant rule applies regardless of whether the vehicle is 
actually in motion at the time. Seq Carney. 471 U.S. at 391. 
Under this exception to the warrant rule, officers may 
temporarily detain a vehicle and its occupants upon reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity for the purpose of conducting a 
limited investigation of the suspicion.2 Whren v. United States. 
517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 659, 
663 (1979). Reasonable suspicion may be based on information 
provided by a citizen if that information, coupled with available 
corroboration, is sufficiently reliable under the totality of the 
circumstances. See Alabama v. White. 496 U.S. 325, 330-32 
(1990) . Cwing to inherent safety concerns and the limited nature 
of the intrusion, officers may order the occupants of a vehicle 
to leave the vehicle during the course of the investigation. See 
t*aryJi3nd V« VMsen* 519 U.S. 408, 412-15 (1997); Pennsylvania v. 
mmSi, 434 U.S. 106, 110-11 (1977).3 
2
 The detention "must be temporary and last no longer than 
is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v. 
Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983). 
3
 James asserts that the State has raised concerns relating 
to officer safety for the first time on appeal. This argument is 
misplaced. It is clear that the safety concerns guiding the 
Supreme Court's decision in Mimms do not depend on any particular 
showing that an officer was at heightened risk due to the unique 
circumstances of a given automobile stop, see, e.g.. Knowles v, 
Iowa. 525 U.S. 113, 117-18 (1998) (noting greater risks 
accompanying arrest of vehicle's occupants, which justify 
protective search of vehicle to ensure no weapons are present), 
(Continued on next page.) 
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511 The specific issue on certiorari in this case concerns 
the Fourth Amendment propriety of opening the driver's-side door 
of James's truck for the purpose of speaking to James and 
requesting that he step out of the vehicle. As a preliminary 
matter, we note that the facts of the case definitively 
demonstrate that Kendrick's detention of James was based on more 
than adequate reasonable suspicion.4 Kendrick's investigation 
was founded on a citizen's detailed report of a reckless driving 
pattern that was consistent with driving under the influence. 
The citizen's identification of the license plate and description 
of the truck were corroborated in all material respects by the 
highway patrol dispatch office, and, subsequently, by Kendrick's 
own observation. Kendrick also viewed James's pickup pulling 
into the driveway at the registered address. Thus, under the 
totality of the circumstances, Kendrick had the right and the 
authority to temporarily detain James and investigate the report 
of reckless driving,5 It follows that Kendrick was legally 
authorized to order James to step from the cab of his truck.6 
£fi£ Mimms, 434 U.S. at 110-11; State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 
3(Footnote continued.) 
but rather are of an inherent and general nature. See Mimms. 4 34 
U.S. at 108-10 (officer required defendant to step out of vehicle 
as a routine precautionary measure). Hence, the "issue" of 
officer safety is not a distinct argument, subject to waiver 
analysis. It is instead an inherent aspect of the governing 
caselaw, which we are not at liberty to disregard. 
4
 Although the court of appeals did not address this issue 
at any length, we must necessarily dispose of it to reach the 
question presented on certiorari. 
5
 In Kavsvllle Cltv v.' Mulcahv, 943 P.2d 231, 235-36 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997), the court of appeals noted that the inherent 
reliability of information volunteered by a citizen will usually 
be much greater than that provided by an anonymous tip or by a 
paid informant. As such, the necessity of corroborating 
observation or information is correspondingly reduced for 
purposes of the totality of the circumstances analysis. Id. 
6
 The court of appeals noted that the evidence was not 
entirely clear on the question of whether Kendrick did or did not 
tap on the driver's window before opening the door. 5ee James. 
1999 UT App. 17, *3, 977 P.2d 489. The trial court, in its order 
denying James's motion to suppress, made no specific finding 
regarding this question, and we likewise consider it immaterial 
to decision of the case on certiorari. 
5 No. 990267 
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1135 (Utah 1989}. He needed neither consent nor a warrant to 
make this request, 
fl2 The court of appeals' analysis overlooks the 
fundamental distinction between detention and questioning of 
James himself (a procedure specifically authorized by Mimms) and 
a search for physical items of evidence not in plain view, such 
as narcotics or firearms. In this regard, we note that the issue 
of Kendrick's discovery of the open container is not before us, 
nor was it an issue before the court of appeals. Kendrick was 
acquitted on the open container charge. 
$13 James's defense of the court of appeals' decision 
further assumes that there is a functional distinction between 
Kendrick's opening the door himself and his requiring James to 
open it. The court of appeals cited State v. Laroccq. wherein 
this court established, by plurality decision, a rule prohibiting 
warrantless searches of vehicles in the absence of probable cause 
and exigent circumstances. See 794 P.2d 460, 469-71 (1990) 
(Durham, J., joined by Zimmerman, J.) (prohibiting opening of 
vehicle door to examine vehicle identification number); id. at 
473 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result); see also Stafre v. 
Anderson. 910 P.2d 1229, 1236-37 (Russon, J., joined by Howe, J.) 
(reciting and applying Larocco rule to search of vehicle for 
contraband); isL, at 1239 (Zimmerman, C.J., concurring in the 
result); id. at 1239-41 (Stewart, J., concurring in the result); 
id. at 1241-42 (Durham, J., concurring and dissenting); 
Schlosser. 774 P.2d at 1135-36 (holding that opening of vehicle 
door to search for contraband violated Fourth Amendment). 
However, all of these cases are inapposite; they addressed the 
opening of doors or searches of vehicles to search for physical 
evidence, as opposed to lawful detention and questioning of 
individuals. In this case, Kendrick was investigating James 
himself, and was not searching James's vehicle. Causing the door 
to be opened in some manner was a reasonable and practical means 
for obtaining compliance with Kendrick's authority to lawfully 
require James to step from the vehicle. As such, the opening of 
the door was an incidental factor in the investigation of James's 
impaired physical condition, and not an independent search of the 
vehicle. To draw distinctions as.to who actually opened the door 
and the nature of any conversation or notification occurring 
beforehand would elevate form over substance. We therefore 
overrule the court of appeals' holding that Kendrick's opening of 
James's door, in the context of a lawful investigation into the 
reasons for James's reckless driving, constituted a violation of 
the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches. 
$14 Although our resolution of this issue renders 
immaterial the court of appeals' conclusion that the inevitable 
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discovery exception was inapplicable, the State has expressed 
concern that the court of appeals' holding on that issue will 
establish incorrect precedent. We therefore briefly address this 
issue. The inevitable discovery "exception" has been described 
as an exception to the exclusionary rule, which dictates that 
evidence obtained by virtue of illegal police activity must be 
suppressed at trial. The exception provides that evidence that 
would have been obtained regardless of illegal police activity 
will not be suppressed because to do so would violate the 
underlying policy of the exclusionary rule—which is to place the 
police in a position that is neither better nor worse than it 
would have been absent the illegal activity. See Mix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 443-44 (1984). 
115 The court of appeals held that the inevitable discovery 
exception can be satisfied only by an "entirely independent, 
alternate, intervening, appreciably attenuated investigation 
aside from the tainted investigation." jlamfia, 1999 UT App, 17, 
521, 977 P.2d at 493. The State maintains that these criteria 
are not required by the inevitable discovery exception, but are 
instead merely descriptive of a subcategory of cases falling 
within the "independent source doctrine/' The State concedes 
that the independent source doctrine describes one method of 
satisfying the inevitable discovery exception, which is to 
demonstrate that the same evidence uncovered by illegal police 
activity would have been obtained by an entirely independent, 
prior investigation. Nevertheless, the State argues that the 
independent source doctrine is not coextensive with the 
inevitable discovery exception. 
116 We agree. In Nix, the United States Supreme Court 
described the distinction between the specific requirements of 
the independent source doctrine and the broader dictates of the 
policy underlying the inevitable discovery exception. See Nix, 
467 U.S. at 443-44. The Supreme Court noted that the fundamental 
policy advanced by the inevitable discovery exception was the 
same as that of the independent source doctrine. 
The independent source doctrine teaches us 
that the interest of society in deterring 
unlawful police conduct and the public 
interest in having juries receive all 
probative evidence of a crime are properly 
balanced by putting the police in the same, 
not a HQJLflLS., position tha[n] they would have 
been in if no police error or misconduct had 
occurred. 
7 No, 990267 
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Id, at 443. Because this policy, rather than the specific nature 
of the investigation or investigations determines whether the 
exclusionary rule, requires suppression of evidence, the Supreme 
Court concluded that the appropriate standard governing the 
inevitable discovery exception is whether "the prosecution can 
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the information 
ultimately would have been discovered by lawful means." Id. at 
444. This is the standard that must be met to avoid suppression 
and it does not necessarily include the elements dictated by the 
court of appeals. To the extent it is appropriate to elaborate 
upon or elucidate the Nix standard/ by adopting more specific 
requirementsf we may do so in a future appropriate case. It is 
therefore sufficient for our purpose here to hold that the 
requirements adopted by the court of appeals do not correctly set 
forth the inevitable discovery standard. 
117 in conclusion/ we note that our decision of the issues 
presented on certiorari does not completely resolve this case. 
Before the court of appeals# James presented a third distinct 
ground for suppression of at least a portion of the evidence of 
his intoxication. Specifically/ he argued that Kendrick and 
Hancock lacked the probable cause and exigent circumstances 
necessary to enter his garage without a warrant and arrest him. 
Because the court of appeals did not address this argument/ see 
Reese v. Reese. 1999 UT 75, 19, 984 P.2d 987, we remand to the 
court of appeals for appropriate treatment.7 
118 Chief Justice Howef Associate Chief Justice Russon, 
Justice Durham, and Justice Wilkins concur in Justice Durrant's 
opinion. 
7
 In some circumstances, we have been willing to treat 
issues not addressed by the court of appeals for purposes of 
judicial economy. See, e.gty State v. Brooks, 908 P.2d 856, 861 
(Utah 1995). Even were we inclined to address this issue, it has 
not been briefed or argued by either party on certiorari. 
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